MARTIN LIBICKI
Chapter 6
Conclusions
Successively deeper infusions of information technology into DOD military equipment
would, in and of itself, help it fight better, but information technology can also
transform the capabilities of the U.S. military in two fundamental ways:
- Illuminating the battlespace will permit DOD to see and therefore defeat foes by
striking from standoff range or by supporting local warfighters with information. Thus DOD
can cope with foes nastier than today's canonical opponents.
- A sufficiently adaptive Grid may help warfighters see patterns of conflict in complex
and chaotic situations enabling the DOD to cope with messier situations better.
To see well, DOD must have a vision for its Grid. Otherwise, what it calls the Grid
will be merely the clutter of point solutions to point problems, incapable of integration
and inflexible against a foe with a talent for the unexpected. Let bits be bits. If they
are accessible and the tools for their exploitation exist, knowledge can be drawn from
them. An adaptive Grid is more difficult to build and, in many ways, control (although not
necessarily harder to manage). But it is an important ideal with these features:
- Input. Complex sensors would be supplemented with a mesh of distributed
commercial-grade sensors (and some bistatic ones). Automatic coordination of sensors would
be the rule, especially for ground sensors or cheap UAVs.
- Connectivity. Nodes would not only transfer messages but, in many cases, also
understand them. Bandwidth to the field would suffice for visual exchange and
whiteboarding. Messages would be routed on the basis of such criteria as content (rather
than only subject) and user context (not just identity) to support automatic event-driven
notification. Allies would enjoy broad access to the Grid.
- Processing. Facts would affect estimates based on criteria and rules that can be
developed as needed. Particular sensor readings, events, and agent-initiated actions could
spur further data processing. To respond to complex questions, the Grid could summon
experts and present them with complex tableaux for evaluation.
- Geoprocessing. The link among image acquisition, object identification, and
object location would be automatic or nearly so. Broadcasting data would allow weapons to
track moving targets by reference to location.
- Integrity. Flexibility in design and sufficient systems abstraction, among other
tools, would help users merge disparate systems in nearly real time. Any unexpected
condition that generates incorrect behavior would be scrutinized. New capabilities, once
resident and cleared, could announce themselves.
- Output. Users could manipulate data flow and presentation to raise their
intuitive understanding of what they were looking at. They could use many tools to search
for information.
Because great change without great challenge is perilous, the argument for the Grid
must be explicit.200
Technology is not the issue;201 the United States
will always lead with its strongest suit. The issue is what technology where.
Platforms are starting to look like the mainframe computers of war,202 at once too big
(compared with individual commercial-grade sensors and weapons) and too small (compared
with the knowledge base of a fully networked establishment). Monolithic information
systems are both too complex and too narrow. When material purchased between the 1960s and
the 1980s wears out, decisions on how to recapitalize the military, if made in the context
of today's force structure, may ensure that tomorrow's military will have the look and
feel of yesterday's.
DOD can ignore what technology is saying; today's adversaries seem even more blind. But
it is asking a lot of history that they remain blind forever. Some day, others, not
necessarily friendly others, will see the light. It would be best if the light they see is
ours.
|
