| The views and opinions expressed in this article express those of solely
the author and should not be construed to represent the official views of the Department
of Defense or the National Defense University What constitutes an "act of
war" in the "information age. This is a question that most members of the
"IW community" have wrestled with, and it's a question that places one squarely
on the horns of a dilemma: if you cannot easily answer whether an act belongs to the legal
codes of war or peace, how can you make a determination of the act's ethical status?
There is a mindset that IW has become part of the ongoing debate about non-lethal
weapons and military technologies. While this is not the place to enter the debate about
the effectiveness or utility of such technologies and capabilities, this is a good place
to briefly explore what we mean by "non-lethal"? A bomb that blows up a train or
airplane is certainly "lethal", but what of a HERF Gun that disables all
electronically controlled systems, including signal devices or movement controls, and thus
causes crashes or other movement failures that result in injuries and death...is that
"non lethal?" The distinction between what could be called first-order and
second-order effects is important. A laser-guided bomb, delivered precisely against a
target of clear military value and entirely in accordance with the existing laws of armed
conflict--an electric power plant--might not kill or injure anyone in the immediate
explosion of the bomb, yet help create the conditions that later lead to illness and
fatalities. The distinction between immediate and longer-term collateral damage is not new
to the information age, but its technologies exacerbate the uncertainty as well as focus
the publicity that accrues from such events. If these issues are the subject of vigorous
and widespread debate over old and long existing technologies such as aerial-delivered
high explosive bombs, how long will we wrestle with the uncertainty surrounding the use of
new and technologically sophisticated devices?
This leads almost directly into another key issue, the growing intermingling in the
integrated information society of systems used and needed by both the military and civil
sides of society. A century ago this was a minor problem because of the limited reach and
range of weaponry. Armies fought in linear formations and engaged with shoulder arms,
while the range of turn of the century artillery was limited to just a few miles. Its
targets were almost always clearly military in nature, except for those rare situations
when a siege was undertaken, and the laws of land warfare have always been relatively
forgiving in the case of sieges. What changed all this was the airplane, because its range
was orders of magnitude greater than artillery. Suddenly (and I use the term
intentionally...a leap in range of at least 1000% over the span of less than a decade
qualifies as "sudden") all of the army's "rear areas" were open to
attack, including perhaps its capital city, such as London or Paris. The result of the
synergies between new technology (the bomber) and human factors (the revulsion against the
futility and slaughter of WW I-style trench warfare) was--to use the current buzz
phrase--a revolution in military affairs. Airmen such as Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell,
and Hugh Trenchard thought they saw a way to avoid a repetition of the carnage and
bloodbath of WW I. The airplane could take the war directly to new and vital targets...the
social, political and industrial centers of national power that had heretofore been
unreachable. But this placed the new weapon precisely on the horns of a sharp ethical
dilemma. Unlike armies on a battlefield, these targets were often totally interspersed
with the noncombatant, civilian populace that the law of war was expressly intended to
protect. Which, then, was the greater evil or good...to protect the civilians at the
expense of another generation of Europe's young men, or to spare hundreds of thousands,
perhaps millions, of young soldiers by killing and injuring a lesser but still very large
number of innocent civilians? Not until the recent development and demonstrated proof of
the effectiveness of precision weaponry has this conundrum been alleviated, albeit at the
cost of a new conundrum discussed earlier.
This returns to the information society's intermingling of military and civilian
systems, for Information Warfare forces us to face anew the ethical difficulty faced by
Douhet, Mitchell and Trenchard. If Bits and Bytes offer an alternative form of exerting
national power than bombs and bullets, which ethical mandate should we follow? That which
attempts to hold separate the military from the civilian, no matter what the overall cost
in blood and suffering, or that which attempts to minimize the destructiveness and
duration of the conflict, even at the expense of affecting systems or functions that are
clearly and unquestionably civilian? Worse, might our own national infrastructures and
systems lead an opponent into precisely this course of action? Since by our own admission
over 90% of DOD's daily communications travel over civilian owned and operated
communication systems, doesn't this condition make our national information infrastructure
a viable, legal and ethical target in case of conflict? Perhaps, and it well illustrates
the dilemma that the integrated information society poses for the military planner who
must take such legal and ethical concerns into consideration when planning possible
military operations. As with airpower theory in the 1920s and 30s, the new technology
combines with human factors such as the desire to reduce bloodshed to provide a new form
of warfare...IW.
The development of new capabilities has not simplified the situation, only exacerbated
it. Some of these capabilities can be grouped into four general types: intelligence;
offensive computer weaponry (hardware and software); directed energy-type weaponry (HERF
guns, EMP devices, etc); and PSYOPs. In a narrow sense the discussion of intelligence
might seem out of place, since espionage has not been considered the same as
warfare (it lacks the destructiveness and violence, for starters), although it is
indispensable to warfare. Henry Stimson's famous adage "gentlemen don't read
other gentlemen's mail" notwithstanding, it is clear that throughout history men
(gentle or otherwise) HAVE read other men's mail, especially when in the service of state
or sovereign. In modern times the ability to electronically gather intelligence has become
not only understood and accepted but its ethical correctness has become enshrined in the
arms control lexicon as "national technical means", a crucial part of the
verification process, without which the SALT and START agreements would have been
impossible. But the new technologies of the information age raise a new and frightening
specter...the inability to distinguish between espionage and war. In the "good old
days" the two were clearly separate. Even such dangerous and legally-suspect
activities as overflights of the USSR by U-2s in the 1950s were obviously not war; and if
a state of armed conflict such as that between the USA and North Vietnam existed,
activities (such as overflight) that would have been prohibited otherwise had the legal
sanction as a permissible activity of a belligerent. But what if the espionage is
conducted by computer, probing into adversary databanks and control systems to determine,
for example, how their air defense system functions. Is the penetration passive, merely
intelligence gathering, or was a trojan horse or logic bomb planted in the process,
designed to "lower shields" on command? Would that be considered an "act of
war"? The legal and ethical implications are a bit murky, and much might depend on
the surrounding context and history.
Even this, however, does not get as murky as economic espionage. The
"traditional" espionage that states conduct concerning political-military
subjects are better understood...fighter plane design, treaty negotiations, weapons
testing, etc. But suggestions that governments, at least those of free market economies,
engage in espionage to gain economic intelligence immediately raises the issue of who will
receive the coveted information...all of the different companies making the new and
improved widgets, or just one company? Are any of the companies involved transnational,
involving significant foreign elements? This may be the most difficult ethical issue
involved in this suggestion because it involves domestic business practices and existing
national business law. Yet his observation that other countries certainly engage in
economic espionage is well taken, and faces us with the possibility that perhaps in some
situations our ethical and legal restrictions on such activities may place us at a severe
disadvantage in dealing with a country that does not share the same set of moral and
ethical scruples as we.
The second general type of capability cited above concerns a form of computer
warfare...modifying either the internal software or hardware to cause the enemy's computer
to behave in a manner other than they expect. Software modifications are perhaps the
better known of the two...viruses, logic bombs, trojan horses, and all the other means
that have been developed to get the software or programming to carry out actions or
instructions that serve your purposes. Hardware modifications, such as
"chipping" the microchip to add or delete key functions, are more difficult,
requiring access to the chip before it is ever installed in the machine. Not surprisingly,
there are a couple of ethical questions that come to the surface.
Although much depends on "when" the action is being taken, gaining entry into
someone's operating system (and whether that someone is a person or a state does matter)
and planting software instructions carries the same ethical concerns as carrying out that
action for intelligence gathering purposes. If we are "at peace" such an act
could range from being a criminal act to being an act of information age statecraft,
although the laws and ethical standards that guide the conduct of individuals,
corporations and states vary significantly. If we are "at war" or in a state of
armed conflict such an act would be a legitimate act of belligerency...although we'll
leave the definition of "at war" open for the moment. It would seem that when
engaged in war, the degree of intrusiveness required to gain access to an adversary
computer system and alter the programming would be minor compared to the amount of
intrusiveness necessary to place a 1000lb laser guided bomb in the programming! In the
case of peacetime hardware modifications, however, such as "chipping", the
issues become murkier. Unless one postulates the ability to gain physical access to the
enemy computer during wartime and insert the "secret chip", this would have to
be accomplished during "peacetime", which carries some interesting ethical
issues. If the chip being "chipping" is commercially manufactured, are we
involving the manufacturer in the effort? There could be some interesting legal
complications from that action downstream. If other nations that do business with the firm
learn of its complicity and cut their ties, is the government responsible for their loss?
Even if such a loss is not a legal liability, is it an ethical one? If we take such an
action, have we crossed an invisible line that separates "prudent preparation"
from "hostile action"? If you take into account modern electronic warfare that
can provide the rationale for using deadly force (firing an anti-radiation missile against
a radar site) based solely on the way electrons are used (switching a radar from the
surveillance mode to target acquisition/firing mode), there are interesting and pragmatic
precedents for gauging hostility solely on the way one uses cyberspace.
The third category of information weaponry, those that employ some form of energy, seem
to be the most similar to traditional forms of weaponry, even if they work their impact by
rearranging electrons rather than atoms, steel plates, or body parts. The ethical
conundrums would come from the target against which the weapon would be used and the
existence or lack of a state of war. Disabling the electronics of a fighter plane or air
defense radar during wartime would be fully in agreement with the existing laws of war and
would face no ethical dilemmas regarding such an action; disabling the electronics of a
civilian airliner or an air traffic control radar during peacetime, however, would be a
criminal act, and even if done during wartime might very well violate one or more of the
basic principles that instruct the law of war, such as discrimination or proportionality.
In short, the ethical issues involved here stem from the function or capability of the
target being struck and whether a state of conflict exists at the time of use. These are
issues similar to those faced in the use of current and traditional kinetic weaponry.
It is in the fourth general category, psychological operations or PSYOPS, that we find
an interesting blend of the traditional and the new to pose ethical concerns surrounding
the use of information warfare. Propaganda and disinformation have a long and storied
history in the annals of warfare and statecraft. Napoleon's agents preceded the armies of
Revolutionary and Imperial France as they marched across Europe, posting handbills in
soon-to-be-liberated towns announcing the imminent arrival of the Enlightenment. In World
War I, the British decision to sever all of the transatlantic telegraph cables that linked
Germany to the outside world meant that the view of the war seen in New York was the one
filtered through a lens in London. In 1995, Ecuador went onto the Net with web pages full
of information proving that Peru was the aggressor in their border clash. Earlier
information technologies such as the radio and TV provided new and potent ways to engage
in IW, and the microchip has not simplified the issue. Can anyone who saw Tom Hanks
conversing with John F Kennedy in the movie "Forrest Gump" have any doubts that
it is technologically possible to produce computer-enhanced or "morphed"
videotape that clearly and conclusively shows adversary leadership violating sacred
religious or cultural precepts, in order to destabilize a regime? How would the new
technology have served George, the protagonist of Orwell's novel 1984, who's job it
was to rewrite history? What will happen when someone generates "new" Holocaust
imagery and thus calls into question the entire body of information regarding the Nazi's
genocide campaign? What will happen to the old saw, "seeing is believing" when
the eyes can be so easily fooled? What are the ethical issues involved in such possible
techniques and operations? Does the status or location of the intended or target audience
(domestic, international, enemy, etc) affect this issue? This is not an area for which the
law currently has many answers...mostly questions that fall well outside of the common
understanding of the law of war. There are existing American laws that address the issue
of conducting psyops or propaganda within the US...it's against the law! But new
information technologies make some of these prescriptions difficult. There have already
been cases in which material disseminated overseas by the USIA has been electronically
posted to the internet and thus became available domestically to American citizens, which
resulted in threatened lawsuits. The issue here is the dreaded term "perception
management", and the possibility that the information being used manage the
perceptions of foreign audiences and groups could be used by someone to shape or manage
the perceptions of the American populace. Both the legality and ethics of such an activity
would be questionable, regardless of the technology used to carry it out.
A particularly thorny issue that is surfacing concerns the possibility for assymetrical
conflict between a state and a non-state. The Information Age offers some unique
capabilities for non-state entities to engage in conflict with one state while using
another for cover, or even the reverse...a state using an NGO for cover! The legal and
ethical mix is fascinating...how would a state respond to such an action, especially if
the means used were informational or non-lethal. Could a digital, electronic informational
attack, whether by a state or another entity, meet the criteria of the terminology used in
the UN Charter, such as "armed attack" and "Threats to the Peace, Breaches
of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression"?
This last point brings us full circle and to closure on the question "what is an
act of war in the Information Age?" Does the oft-cited "Clausewitzian
Paradigm" require force, violence, and nation-state actors for there to be
"war"? It's somewhat ironic that despite entirely appropriate caution about the
current overuse of the word "War", our Services do not have a "Law of
War", but rather a "Law of Armed Conflict"! And how do we define
"force" and "violence"? If we compel another state or political actor
to do our will haven't we "forced" them to do so, whether or not we've used high
explosive? Must the means used to exert the force be violent, in isolation of the ends or
outcomes? To further argue the issue, what is the real difference whether a hostile state
used surface-to-air missiles to shoot down 10 airliners and kill 1000 people or used
advanced technological IW devices to jam their flight controls so that the same airliners
crashed and the same people were killed? Is there an ethical or legal difference between
those actions? By 6AM local time on 17 January 1991 there was no doubt that a "state
of armed conflict" existed between Iraq and the UN Coalition, after we had physically
destroyed much of their integrated air defense system. Would the situation have been
significantly different if we had been able to do so solely using advanced technological
means, without penetrating or violating Iraq's sovereign airspace or dropping any high
explosive bombs? Would that exercise and demonstration of information power equate to
"war", as did the 1991 exercise of airpower. The book is still very much open,
and we need a vigorous and spirited debate, on the ethical and legal status of IW and the
new paradigm of information age national security. There's a new technology in town,
there's a new environment in which we're just beginning to learn how to operate, and if
history is any guide, we'll be wrestling with these issues for decades to come. |