Bruce W. Fowler & Donald R. Peterson
Recognition of the value of information and advances in information
processing capability uncover new risks
About a year ago (as we are writing this), Dr. Donald Gaver, the distinguished chair of
operations research at the Naval Postgraduate School, called us and asked if we could
develop a presentation for a session on Information Warfare that he was chairing for the
Atlanta National INFORMS Meeting. At that time, we were just finishing an analysis of
cruise missile threat strategies and had become interested in how those strategies carried
over to Information Warfare, so Dr. Gaver's invitation gave us an added incentive. That
presentation, on which this paper is based, explored what we had learned, namely that the
(expected or possible) changes in warfare brought about by the technology and paradigm of
information were fraught with new potential fragilities that transcend the traditional
scope of warfare.
Most of this analysis was done at the strategic level, so most of the tools we used were
strategic in nature, and there remains considerable room for additional analysis, mostly
at the operational and tactical level. These tools were varied, ranging from classical
military analytical techniques such as Kritik [1] and deficiency analysis through Jones'
Force-to-Space model [2], as well as the usual library of operations research techniques.
Since more work is possible, we will try to indicate the directions we think those efforts
might take.
As the Cold War was winding down, and the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall were
collapsing, military-political thinkers and planners recognized that the nature of the
world was changing. One of those changes was the likelihood of what is now called a
Revolution in Military Affairs [3]. A "Revolution in Military Affairs is a major
change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new
technologies which, when combined with dramatic changes in Military Doctrine and
Operational and Organizational Concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of
military operations."[4] Since then, we have seen changes that enormously alter the
face of American military operations: the rebirth of Regionalism, long submerged by
superpower competition; the spread of democracy, with its sweet promise and bitter
disappointment of (dis)enfranchisement; the difficulties of projecting just power from
North America; and the evidence of technological efficiency in the form of precision
delivery weapons and digital information processing and communication.
Information Age Warfare
The vision, doctrine and practice of this new environment for military operations is
collected under a variety of names, one of which is Information Age Warfare. In simple
terms, Information Age Warfare may be seen as the union of classical warfare with the
cultural and technological aspects of information. We depict this in Figure 1, which is
adapted from Molander et al.[5].
In walking our way through this figure, we may start with the upper right hand corner.
Modern Warfare (Cold War) was essentially the persisting warfare of modern mechanized
(ground and air) forces with components associated with nation building (aimed at
containment of the Soviet Union), and pieces of Information Warfare such as psychological
operations (playing rock music outside Manuel Noriega's palace in Panama), and
intercepting radio transmissions. When combined with the political environment of the
post-Cold War world, the scope of Modern Warfare reorients to place greater emphasis on
what is known as Operations Other Than War (including disaster relief, counter-terrorism
and counter-drug operations, and peace keeping and enforcement).
On the left hand side of the figure, we may start with the technology of information --
processing, storage and communications -- much of which is purely commercial and gives
rise to the culture and infrastructure of cyberspace such as the Internet. This
"new" environment gives rise to Information Warfare which not only subsumes some
of the old pieces such as deception, psychological operations, jamming and interception,
but adds all of the vulnerabilities implicit to the information technology and culture
such as computer viruses and spamming. (In military terms, the first attacks computer
operating systems or programs and compromises their performance; the second clogs the
communication links and disrupts timely transfer of information.)
The union of these two is Information Age Warfare, but is more than a simple combination.
One feature of Information Age Warfare is the perception that control of information may
be more important than air superiority was in previous wars. Information technology is
more than just an enhancement of traditional military command and control, it changes the
whole vision of military operations. Of course, very few missions can be accomplished
solely with information means; information dominance without military means will not hold
or take contested ground.
Another feature of Information Age Warfare is a blurring of traditional boundaries. This
blurring is multi-dimensional, but one of the most obvious is the distinctions among the
philosophical levels of strategic-operational-tactical organization. As we studied these
interactions, and in particular this blurring, the evidence for new fragilities became a
recurring theme.
Fragility and Information Age Warfare
Most of us have some vision of what fragility is, and we commonly associate it with
physical properties. Crystal vases are fragile, but Tupperware is not. In a military
context, we extend the vision to include organizations, practices and procedures. Simply
put, fragility is an inherent inability, realized or not, to respond to changes in
external conditions. In a context of mission accomplishment, fragility is a substantial
source of risk, and therefore its identification, reduction and control are critical. By
its nature, fragility may occur from either the overt actions of the enemy or what
Clausewitz called the "friction of war" -- those natural occurrences which sap
energy and resources during the course of military operations [6].
To address these "new" fragilities, we first identify some of the defining
features of Information Age Warfare. These are listed in Figure 2. We will consider each
of these in turn.
Feature 1: Low Cost Entry. One of the consequences of both the rapid
technological advance of "information" and the reductions in military budgets is
concurrent adoption of both commercial technology and systems, and dependence on
commercial "information" providers for equipment and services (e.g., the Gulf
War could not have been fought without AT&T, MCI and SPRINT). Both of these are a
source of fragility since the military systems not only share the same weaknesses and
vulnerabilities of the civil systems, but increasingly depend on complex civil networks
whose very complexity and concentration assume a peaceful, well-behaved environment. The
vulnerabilities of these systems to "hackers" (misused in the common connotation
here) who may extract information, introduce inaccurate information, or introduce diseases
such as viruses is a fragility of modern folklore. Combating these vulnerabilities is more
than a matter of strengthening access security, but includes such measures as
counter-hackers which conjures an image illustrating the changes in Information Age
Warfare (computer nerds in uniform?).
The fragility of this feature is not limited to the information infrastructure. This
technology also permits the proliferation of low-cost weapons either on a garage-industry
level or nationally without substantial investment in lengthy and costly research and
development efforts and infrastructure. These weapons can be available to everyone from
disgruntled individuals (the Unabomber) through terrorist groups (nationally sponsored or
otherwise) to nations (or "wannabes"). Anyone with hard cash, a modicum of
technical savvy and will can manufacture or buy precision weapons, and, courtesy of CNN,
inflict grave physical and psychological damage on the populace without placing the
perpetrators at risk like the car bombing of the Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City.
Thus we may be confronted with attacks that come from some unknown actor. If the attacks
are made against information assets, we may not be able to be sure they are attacks.
Sadly, international controls on this technology are probably impossible both due to the
political realities of the post-Cold War with its rebirth of Regionalism and national
competition, and the ascendancy of commercial consumerism with its engine of technological
proliferation.
This is an area rife with opportunity for both operations research experiment and
analysis. How vulnerable are these systems? Even defining the scope of the threat is
fertile. For example, we may want to distinguish between terrorist "hacking"
which emplaces information bombs that might disrupt vital services (electric, telephone or
banking) if the hackers are not placated with publicity or privileges, and military
"hacking" which attacks military capability by disrupting "just in
time" commercial activities which are crucial to military effectiveness. Enumerating
these possibilities amounts to essentially reverse engineering the whole information
network back through the entire societal infrastructure -- an operations research task
that can provide an infinite number of degree projects for graduate students for years.
Feature 2: Blurred Traditional Boundaries. As we indicated earlier, one of
the features of the modern world is a blurring of traditional boundaries. Part of this was
telegraphed decades ago by the rise of multi-national corporations, and part of it results
from the end of the Cold War with Regionalism emerging anew. Forces of regional,
political, ethnic or religious determinism, perhaps frustrated by newly introduced
democratic processes and the discovery of true minority status, have been unleashed. While
Clausewitz's statement that "War is a continuation of policy by other means"[7]
seems to remain valid, the usual consideration that only nations make policy (and thereby
war) must be updated. Basically, any group with a policy goal and the will to use force to
achieve it takes on nation-like characteristics in being able to wage Information Age War.
This complicates the problem of identifying the attacker and determining what action to
take in response. A nationally-sponsored terrorist cruise missile attack on Epcot Center
would have national psychological as well as local physical effect (and that locality
could be very large if the warhead were nuclear, or more likely, chemical or biological),
but our response?
This is another area fertile for operations research investigation. As an example, what
are the precise organizational dynamics that lead a group to assume this will?
Alternately, what is the nature and dynamics of alliances?[8]
Feature 3: Expanded Role for Perception Management. The proliferation of
interest groups with political agendas has been accompanied by increases in communication
availability. While the news media (bashing for liberal bias aside) may not be naively
susceptible to their propaganda, these groups have extensive opportunity for broadcast,
notably the Internet and fax machines. Indeed, the Information Age is characterized by
more sources and quantities of information than can be digested. (Relevant information
seems to increase much slower than total information, so time for understanding suffers at
the cost of filtering.) Coupled with the evolution and expansion of ethical and moral
value ranges in our culture, a fragility of marshaling national will emerges. Increasing
quantities of information and diversities of values combine to complicate consensus while
solidity of value and purpose not only permit interest groups to act but to publicly
rationalize their actions. Factor in distrust of large or established organizations (e.g.,
the government), and the fragility only deepens.
The connection between information visibility and disenfranchisement seems illogical, but
it is the other side of the public discussion coin. Traditionally, information (media)
visibility was limited and concentrated on perceived power groups (in the United States,
the two largest political parties and the largest public interest organizations.) This
drove small interest groups to compromise their tenets and goals to combine together to
grow larger and gain information visibility. These groups then grew further because of
their increased visibility and the marginal acceptability of their tenets and goals to
newcomers. Accretion of the disaffected was assured by the visibility and the limited
choices available. Of course, size translated directly into power.
With information visibility available to all, the groups have less incentive to combine
and thus derive a consensual position. While this means that the individual newcomer can
more likely find an interest group which has goals and tenets closely matching those of
the newcomer, it also means that no large, consensual or centrist group emerges and gains
power. The individual groups thus suffer disenfranchisement because they have insufficient
membership to achieve political power in a democracy.
Feature 4: Strategic Intelligence Inadequate. Since nations developed, they
have gathered intelligence on their potential and actual enemies. This task, once simple
but large when the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact presented a monolithic threat, is now
enlarged and complicated by the sheer diversity of actors including not only traditional
nations but terrorists, drug cartels and political aspirants as well. Public repugnance of
intelligence gathering is another source of fragility.
Feature 5: Tactical Warning and Assessment. Given the vulnerability of
information networks to attack (itself difficult to trace and even discern) and the
feasibility and efficacy of attacking logistic targets of national value and visibility,
this lack of intelligence (information) makes prevention more difficult and response more
problematic. Sherlock Holmes could not solve mysteries without observations. Even with
seemingly inexhaustible sources of information, it is hard to analyze these situations.
(We received about 50 separate e-mails after TWA Flight 800 went down asking if it could
be due to a missile attack. It is a simple matter, using publicly accessible data on
warhead size and system ranges, to show that shoulder-fired missiles were vanishingly
unlikely to have been capable of the downing, and that missiles large enough to effect
downing would have required resources and infrastructure available only to nations.
Despite this and growing evidence of an internal failure, missile hypotheses still
proliferate.)
Obviously, knowing something is an attack depends on recognizing what attacks are possible
and profitable. Understanding the complex dynamics of the societal infrastructure is a
precursor to this and would be a follow-on to OR analyses that we indicated earlier.
Feature 6: Building and Sustaining Coalitions is Complicated. History
teaches us that coalitions are difficult to construct and more difficult to maintain.
Given the current environment of national and economic bloc commercial competition,
regionalism, and the absence of a clearly defined and common enemy, modern coalitions are
more problematic than ever. When we factor in global interdependence (the Ford Escort has
parts from 100 countries), we find yet another fragility of Information Age Warfare.
Fundamentally, we encounter a situation where our neighbors may have sold our enemies
(whoever they are) their weapons, those neighbors may or may not be willing to
"fight" on our side (and they may be on the "other" side tomorrow so
be careful what technology we share with them), and we are dependent on some of their
resources, services or products which, in turn, are vulnerable to attack. Even without the
other complications, the latter situation makes an irresolvable fragility. Future
coalitions seem likely to be have either many members (everybody plays) or none (nobody
plays).
Again, we have already indicated that there is fertile ground here for OR analysis of
organizational dynamics -- in this case, coalition dynamics. The question here is
complicated by the inclusion of risk management.
Feature 7: Vulnerability of the U. S. Homeland. We have all lived with the
vulnerability of the United States to attack for 50 years, but that threat was basically
only from the Soviet Union -- it was not a diffuse threat. More importantly, before
intercontinental ballistic missiles, attack was considerable only during war and then not
truly conceivable. Given the accessibility and cost of attack, whether to information
infrastructure or to logistic targets by high technology ad hoc weapons, capability to
attack the American homeland is not inconsiderable. While intent cannot be easily
demonstrated because of the potential lack of intelligence (and is outside the purview of
intelligence), political actors, products of regionalism and democratization have
proliferated and have known agendas that can be advanced by attack. Couple this with the
difficulty of marshaling national will engendered by "spin doctoring" and the
persuasiveness of information, and another fragility emerges. We may be attacked in our
homes, but we may not know we have been attacked, we may not know who attacked us, and we
may not be able to react to the attack. In some ways, this is the most frightening
fragility of all, of living in an environment not only of increasing complexity and stress
but of violence as well.
Psychologists tell us that the way to combat our fears is to recognize and confront them.
Considerable components of the fragilities identified here derive from areas which lie at
the core of INFORMS members' knowledge, skills and interests. As operations researchers
and management scientists, we have a natural opportunity to use our professional abilities
to recognize and confront these "fears."
Summary
The modern world with its advances in information technology and infrastructure have a
leavening effect on not only military operations but the world as a whole. Society has
become increasingly interconnected and interdependent, now possibly denying us personal
autonomy and sanctuary. Boundaries of what differentiates military from civil or political
action and nations from other organizations are blurring. Regionalism and democratization
have increased the number of political actors while technology has made the American
homeland vulnerable to information and/or physical attack.
These vulnerabilities do not have to become actual losses, but the potential for those
losses has increased. As society has become more complex, the traditional means for
society to police itself have become susceptible to new fragilities which at least
complicate, and possibly compromise, maintaining that society.
Assuring that these fragilities never actuate, or controlling their scope if they do, is a
fertile field of endeavor for operations research and management science. Examples of this
are in the areas of information, organizational and societal infrastructure dynamics to
identify the nature of information disruption, interest group activation, and the nature
of coalitions.
References
- 1. Clausewitz, Carl von, "Critical Analysis," Chapter Five,
Book Two in "On War," Michael Howard and Peter Paret, editors and translators,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1984, pp. 156-169.
- 2. Jones, Archer, "The Art of War in the Western World,"
Oxford University Press, New York, 1987.
- 3. Mazarr, Michael J., et al., "The Military Technical Revolution -
A Structural Framework," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington,
D.C., March 1993. (See also other paper at the Army War College
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/.)
- 4. Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- 5. Molander, Roger C., Andrew S. Riddile, and Peter A. Wilson,
"Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War." Parameters, Autumn
1996, pp. 81-92. (See also http://www.rand.org/publications/ MR/MR661/MR661.pdf)
- 6. Clausewitz, Carl von, "Friction in War," Chapter Seven in
Book One of "On War," Michael Howard and Peter Paret, editors and translators,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1984.
- 7. Clausewitz, Carl von, "What is War?", Chapter One in Book
One of "On War," Michael Howard and Peter Paret, editors and translators,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1984.
- 8. Saperstein, Alvin M., "War and Chaos," American
Scientist, Vol. 83, November-December 1995, pp. 548 - 555, and references therein.
Bruce W. Fowler is technical director and deputy of the Advanced Systems Concepts
Office of the U. S. Army Missile Command's Research, Development and Engineering Center, a
past councilor at large of the Military Applications Society, and a past member of the
Executive Council of the Redstone Arsenal &endash; Huntsville Military Applications
Section, both of INFORMS. He holds degrees in physics, chemistry and mathematics from the
Universities of Alabama, Illinois and Alabama in Huntsville, and is a graduate of the Army
War College.
Donald R. Peterson is chief of the Concepts Team of the Advanced Systems Concepts
Office, acting chief scientist of the Joint Aerostat Program Management Office, and a
member of the Redstone Arsenal &endash; Huntsville Military Applications Section. He
holds degrees in physics from the University of Alabama and received the Army's Wilbur B.
Payne Operations Research Award for his work in Air Defense.
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