Lieutenant Colonel William R. Fast
ABSTRACT: Information age technologies are changing values and national
interests, both of which drive the formulation of national security strategy. The strategy
equals ends plus ways plus means paradigm must change. Information age knowledge strategy
seeks the ends of cooperative and dynamic competition, uses the ways of network node
control and organizational adaptation, and requires the resource means of valued
information enhanced by experience in exploiting that information. A successful
information age security strategy requires that we balance the ends, ways, and means of
knowledge strategies. Whether we use the political, economic, military, or informational
elements of national power, we serve our strategic ends best when we cooperate to shape
robust information networks that promote dynamic competition and enhance mutual
performance both in the public and private sectors. Further, we must control network nodes
and communications links and secure our information resources. The security and integrity
of our cyberspace must be considered an important, if not vital national interest.
Introduction
As we enter a new technological age, devising the proper national security strategy can
have a profound effect on the outcome of war. There is no better example than the French
approach after World War I. During the interwar period from 1919 to 1939, France
formulated a weak and vulnerable strategy of forward defense, driven by her obsession with
the methodical battle technique perfected at the end of World War I. On 10 May 1940, the
world watched with horror as Germany, with far fewer resources, successfully invaded the
Low Countries and Northern France. Germany had made the right strategic choices; her
blitzkrieg concept of warfighting took full advantage of the mechanization of warfare. (Note 1) While France was mired in an
older strategy, Germany was energized by emerging technology to develop a bold offensive
strategy.
Today, man's ways of making war are changing again because of new information age
technologies. What can we do today to avoid repeating the French debacle? In War and
Anti-War, Alvin and Heidi Toffler argue that we need to formulate a capstone concept of
knowledge strategy to effectively take advantage of these information age technologies. (Note 2) In other words, we need to
understand the ends, ways, and means of information age strategy.
Change introduced by the information age is arguably greater than that which faced the
post-World War I nations.(Note 3)
Moreover, knowledge strategy encompasses more than the military element of power.
Knowledge strategy must also address the political and economic aspects of power, which
become even more useful in the information age. Further, the extent to which we allow our
organizational structures and social patterns to change will determine the success of
knowledge strategy.
This paper describes the effects of information age technologies on our values and
national interests, both of which drive the formulation of security strategy. It also
explains how the ends, ways, and means paradigm of strategy must adapt to the emergence of
information age warfare. (Note 4)
Finally, this analysis postulates a framework for formulating knowledge strategies. (Note 5)
Changing Values and National Interests
Values. The information age brings a new level of personalization to our world
that changes the value of consumer products and services. When ordering a new car,
computer, or even new suit of clothes, we can customize the item to our needs, desires,
and even our own physical measurements. While our personal buying habits have always
characterized us as individuals, now the vendor can easily capture our unique preferences
on bits of digital information. The value added to a product customized to personal
preference is the value of knowledge. No longer do we have to accept the statistical norm.
(Note 6) We have come to expect and
receive personalized products and services. We value personalization. Now the
information-based market can tap this added value.
Americans also value their rights as individuals. The information age promotes and
enhances these rights by empowering the individual. Unlike television and radio,
information age digital communications allow on-demand programming -- we simply have to
ask explicitly for what we want and when we want it. With a computer terminal and
telephone modem, an individual can trade shares any time of the day on any of the world's
major stock exchanges. Telecommunications and virtual reality technologies make it
possible for doctors at the Mayo Clinic to perform surgery on patients in any part of the
world. In sum, the information age empowers individuals with access, mobility, and the
ability to effect change anywhere, instantaneously. This is what makes the information age
so different from the past. (Note 7)
The value that we place on personalization and individual rights affects our world view
and our expectations of nation-states. Single-issue politics forces our government to act
on problems that are important to a few but often secondary to the majority. For example,
the narrow interests of lobbyists have a disproportionate impact on legislation passed by
the U.S. Congress. Knowledge workers, arguably better informed in their narrow fields of
endeavor than government regulators, increasingly resent and even oppose government
intervention. (Note 8) They use the
words privatize, liberalize, and deregulate when advocating the rules for applying
information age technologies to businesses. (Note 9) We must be careful not to
politically disenfranchise these knowledge workers and their virtual communities. (Note 10)
Spurred by information age technologies, our highly personalized social and political
processes have become interconnected and nonlinear, making it difficult to distinguish
cause from effect and effect from cause. We have created more nodes of power and
influence. Our cyber-future will feature direct participation by the individual as opposed
to group representation. (Note 11)
As a result, the relevance of authority and sovereignty have diminished. (Note 12) This is not bad. In 1787,
James Madison said: "To give information to people is the most certain and the most
legitimate engine of government." (Note
13) Yet harnessing the power of that engine is the challenge of knowledge strategy.
How do we define national interests and objectives, the ends of strategy, in the
information age?
National Interests. As its value increases within our global economy,
information is fast becoming a strategic national asset. Natural resources (minerals, oil,
etc.), long the strength of a growing industrial economy, are becoming less important.
This is because information-based economies place more importance on intellectual capital
and intellectual labor than on material capital and physical labor. (Note 14) In addition, the computers
that manipulate this information are potential first-strike targets. Most of our $6
trillion domestic economy depends upon our 125 million computers tied together by land-
and satellite-based communications. (Note
15) Protecting this infrastructure must now be considered as a primary security
objective.
We have already witnessed the growth of national economic partnerships. An example is
the partnership of American Airlines, MCI, and Citibank. Travel on American Airlines,
phone calls on MCI, and charges on Citibank's credit card now earn free American Airlines
trips for the user. (Note 16)
Through networking, the information age will allow more international economic alliances
as well. The paradox is that networked economic alliances decrease the sovereignty of the
nation-state. When the exchange of value occurs by electronic transmission rather than the
transfer of products, trade policies become less important than the location of the
network nodes. (Note 17)
Governments that take the lead in understanding and building networks will gain enormous
comparative advantages. (Note 18)
Thus, pursuit of economic well-being and prosperity take on new prominence in the
information age.
Similarly, the information age elevates the importance of political interests over
security interests. Information age technologies can seriously erode totalitarian regimes.
The political change in Central and Eastern Europe from 1989 to 1991 was not the aftermath
of war, but the result of peaceful movements for individual rights, democracy, and better
economic conditions. (Note 19)
Encouraging the nations and peoples of the world to value human rights and democratic
principles becomes easier with the Internet and direct broadcast television. In addition,
political alliances become easier to maintain as common understanding replaces chaotic
misunderstanding. The Clinton administration has understood this shift. One objective of
Clinton's National Security Strategy is the enlargement of the community of democratic
states committed to free markets and respect for human rights. (Note 20) Clearly, information age
technologies are tools of preventive diplomacy; they can help promote democracy and human
rights in those states where we have the greatest concerns for stability and security.
Thus, the information age has changed the nature of our economic and political
interests and impacted on our national security interests. During the Cold War, concerns
for power balance drove our economic policies and diplomatic relations. It was a zero-sum
game. Trade sanctions, embargoes, and prohibitions on exporting critical wartime
technologies severely distorted our economic policies. At times, we supported nations
despite their politics or stand on human rights so long as they didn't embrace communism.
Unlike the Cold War era, political and economic interdependency in the information age
requires cooperation and the open exchange of knowledge. (Note 21) We now play in a
non-zero-sum game where win-win outcomes are not only expected but are required for
democracies and information-based economies to flourish.
More than 2,300 years ago, the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu appreciated values,
interests, and the rational comparison of power. Before launching a military campaign, he
said that the temple council should compare unity on the homefront and the morale of the
army with that of the enemy. He also understood the inevitable economic burdens that war
laid upon the people. (Note 22) So
it is today. Understanding shifts in our values, interests, and in the relative importance
of the elements of power helps us understand why the ends, ways, and means paradigm of
national security strategy must change in the information age.
Changing the Ends, Ways, and Means Model of Strategy
The ends, ways, and means paradigm posits that strategy equals ends plus ways plus
means. Ends are expressed as national objectives drawn from national values and interests.
Ways are courses of action to achieve ends. Means are the resources (manpower, materiel,
money, forces, logistics, etc.) required to support each course of action. Unless ends,
ways, and means are compatible and in balance, the strategy will be at risk. And the
greater the imbalance, the greater the risk. (Note 23) The information age changes
all three elements of the strategy equation.
Ends. In the information age, national objectives (ends), other than the
protection of the national information infrastructure, are not easily identifiable.
Clearly, the emergence of global economic networks delink national corporations from
national markets and turn them multinational. For example, profits from the sale of a new
Boeing 777 aircraft find their way into countries worldwide. Boeing is a broker in the
global economic network, buying materials and components worldwide, basing its
acquisitions on price, availability, quality and any other number of factors. In effect,
Boeing attempts to optimize its entire operation globally. As it does so, it pays little
attention to national allegiance. In such an environment, governmental influence over
Boeing's purchases becomes problematic. Then the implications of a power struggle between
government and industry are very real. (Note
24)
Economic security and prosperity in the information age are functions of a kind of
equality between nations and firms. The more firms act internationally, as in the Boeing
example, the less they can be held to national accountability. Walter Wriston asserts that
"Capital will go where it is wanted and stay where it is well treated." (Note 25) Multinational firms play
one nation-state against the other as they seek the greatest profit. (Note 26) Now trade agreements among
sovereign nations are really inadequate when they don't include the concerns of global
business organizations. (Note 27)
The North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Union are recent attempts of
nations to achieve competitive equality with the growing multinational economic networks.
Yet, in a global information age economy, it will be futile for sovereign states to
attempt to cut off and control even part of the world market. (Note 28) The organizing principles
for the analysis of power have changed. Multinational firms anticipate events and react
quickly in global markets. But governments, whose policies are geographically bound, react
more slowly. (Note 29) Power in
the information age depends more on the ability to influence access and interconnection
than on the capacity to enforce borders. It follows that the ends of our national security
strategy will depend less on confrontation with opponents and more on cooperation and
trust among competitors. (Note 30)
Moreover, total agreement on objectives within a globally linked network is virtually
impossible.
If national economic objectives can't be achieved due to the emergent global and
networked nature of markets, why not ignore global markets completely? Well, ignoring the
networked global markets is risky business, if not impossible, for either a nation-state
or a business concern. Each year since 1965, the U.S. commercial sector has invested more
of its dollars in research and development than has the Department of Defense (DoD). (Note 31) If our military services
are to preserve their technological superiority over potential foes, they must have access
to these commercial products. Similarly, individual businesses can afford neither the
enormous costs nor bear the high risks of remaining on the leading edge of all information
age technologies. Yet they can't afford to miss a breakthrough that could create new
product lines. When businesses share intellectual capital (knowledge) through
participation in global markets, they avoid isolation from new technologies. (Note 32)
Obviously, the ends of our strategy equation have become unclear, since it may be
difficult to achieve all desired national objectives in the globally networked information
age. At best, a sovereign nation might effectively pursue its interests only as it
paradoxically subordinates those interests to the common interests of all networked
partners. (Note 33)
Ways. It is not difficult to show how the ways of security strategy change with
the information age. For example, information age weapons are equalizers. They help small
nations against large nations and favor the weak over the strong. Examples include Stinger
missiles used by the Mujahedin against the Russians and computer viruses designed to
invade individual weapon systems or an entire defense computer network. (Note 34) However, the real problem
lies in the fact that today's breakthrough technologies in electronics, computer systems,
software, and telecommunications come from the commercial marketplace and are available to
anyone in the world. Furthermore, foes may use these technologies to their advantage
without even resorting to military applications.
In broadest terms, information warfare is not new. It encompasses any hostile activity
directed against our knowledge and belief systems. (Note 35) Cyberwar, the newest subset
of information warfare, needs no battlefield -- it is fought in cyberspace. Cyberspace
includes information itself, the communication nets that move it, and the computers that
make it useful. (Note 36)
Cyberspace can be influenced and at times dominated by anyone possessing inexpensive
computers linked into existing global communication nets. The enemy may exploit global
business organizations that produce cyber technology and determine the patterns of change.
(Note 37) He may attempt to
propagate waves of data big enough to crash the network by overloading network switches. (Note 38) Cyberwar operations can
blind us electronically and may change the definition of what is a hostile attack and what
determines defeat. (Note 39)
Under the microscope of world opinion formed by means of pervasive communication
satellites, open warfare is no longer an option for sovereign nations to pursue their
national interests. (Note 40)
Cable News Network coverage can rapidly trigger a negative international response, as we
have seen during the recent wars in Somalia and Bosnia. However, the information age
offers a more subtle approach -- waging a quiet war in cyberspace where digital
fingerprints are hard, if not impossible, to trace. (Note 41) When information warfare
enters and uses public cyberspace, collateral damage may be significant. Banking, finance,
telecommunications, trade, travel, energy, and cultural systems are vulnerable. (Note 42) Misinformation and
disinformation campaigns are easily mounted and hard to defend against. Moreover, an
adequate defense depends upon gathering, analyzing, and distributing intelligence to a
flexible, networked interagency team. (Note
43)
So, the information age introduces at least three new concepts in the ways of strategy.
First, information age weapons are equalizers and can negate the military principle of
mass. Second, cyberwar needs no battlefield and therefore no specially trained military
organization -- even civilians may participate. Finally, the initial offensive strike in a
quiet cyberwar would be hard to detect and to defend against. It is also impossible to
limit the cyberwar battlespace to purely military networks.
Another way of assessing the changes in the ways of strategy is to compare World War I
and II warfare to information age warfare. Whereas the world wars used attrition (WW I)
and maneuver (WW II), information age war emphasizes control. Whereas the world wars
attempted to exhaust (WW I) and annihilate (WW II), cyberwar seeks to paralyze. And
whereas the tools of the world wars were firepower weapons (WW I) and mechanization (WW
II) produced in mass, the tools of information war are limited numbers of inexpensive
computers linked via global communication systems. (Note 44)
Means. Knowledge as a resource is not included in the current resource paradigm
of manpower, materiel, money, forces, and logistics. (Note 45) Knowledge, the
"ammunition" of information war, is inexhaustible. Once produced (at a cost),
knowledge can be used repeatedly -- it will not disappear. In fact, it only increases!
Digital knowledge can be copied and never missed. It can be given away but still kept.
Digital knowledge can be distributed instantly. It is non-linear; it defies the theory of
economy of scale. (Note 46)
Knowledge is the key element of wealth in the information age. Compared with industrial
age manufacturing, information-based industries can produce more with fewer resources,
less energy, and less labor. Production runs of one are possible and even economical with
intellectual capital (knowledge) encoded in software and used by smart machines. (Note 47) The result is an explosion
of personalized products and services. (Note
48) Moreover, knowledge to inform people, coded as digital bits, can be turned into
audio, video, or even graphics -- it is "mediumless." (Note 49) Manpower, materiel, and
forces, on the other hand, possess none of these characteristics.
Knowledge as a resource is often cheaper than materiel. It uses limited manpower or
forces and may require little or no logistics. Thus the information age opens the doors to
the resource poor. Knowledge diffuses and redistributes power to the weaker actors. It
redraws boundaries and time and space horizons. It enables organizations to open up. (Note 50) When it comes to balancing
means with ends and ways, knowledge as a resource offers an economical solution.
In sum, it is difficult to apply the ends, ways, and means paradigm of strategy to
information age security. Unlike traditional means, knowledge is relatively cheap and easy
to balance with ends and ways. Unlike conventional ways, cyberwar defies the military
principle of mass. And its primary objectives are control and paralysis. Unlike the
clearly articulated ends of Cold War security strategies, national objectives in a
globally networked information age are more difficult to define and thus to achieve.
Clearly, we need a new framework for formulating information age knowledge strategies.
A Framework for Formulating Knowledge Strategies
We can formulate knowledge strategies only with an understanding of the strategic
environment of the information age. We can characterize this environment through three
central concepts: cooperative and dynamic competition, the wisdom pyramid, and the
productivity paradox. Also important is an understanding of how the bureaucracies of the
industrial age might transform into the cyberocracies of the information age. Finally, we
must review the importance of information dominance in cyberwar. This background and
understanding will enable us to develop a formula for knowledge strategy.
Strategic Environment. In Being Digital, Nicholas Negroponte proclaims
with optimism that "the control bits of that digital future are more than ever before
in the hands of the young." (Note
51) This is a profound statement when you consider the relatively advanced age of
those who are currently responsible for formulating knowledge strategies! Fortunately,
commercial knowledge industries are at the forefront in formulating knowledge strategies;
they can enlighten us on the characteristics of the strategic information age environment.
The movement of portions of the silicon chip industry from Northern California to
Bangalore, India, is an example of the environment knowledge industries create.
Historically, innovative entrepreneurs in the Silicon Valley in California have made our
computer chips. Now it seems that much of this chip design and engineering has moved to
Bangalore. The reason: Bangalore engineers work for $500 per month, compared with $15,000
per month for an engineer in the Silicon Valley. Further, it is no coincidence that
Bangalore is also the center of the Indian atomic energy industry. As American firms pour
money for computer chips into Bangalore, one must ask what this investment is doing for
India's nuclear weapons program? Clearly, the ability of our government (or the government
of India) to control such economic activity at the national level is in steady decline as
the entrepreneurial net draws the entire world more closely together. (Note 52)
In a global information economy, the growth rates of individual countries should
converge over time. As in the silicon chip example, India gains the newest, most
innovative computer chips while U.S. firms absorb all the costs and risks. (Note 53) Moreover, such alliances
could create new free markets. Cybernations consisting of many like-minded virtual
companies with cyber-economies could emerge. Cultures that have vanished from the real
world may yet be reborn in cyberspace. A network superpower may emerge. (Note 54) Thus, the strategic
environment of the information age equalizes competitors while creating a potential for
international instability.
Cooperative and Dynamic Competition. Another lesson of the silicon chip industry
is that knowledge industries today seek cooperative competition, a framework that
simultaneously enhances mutual performance but shapes the form of their competition. The
United States could also pursue a strategy of cooperative competition in building global
information age networks that would allow her to pursue her national objectives in concert
with other nations. Most important, cooperative competition would allow us to shape the
competition by controlling the protocols of these information networks. (Note 55)
We can become a strategic network broker, balancing competition and cooperation with
other nations by controlling access to and participation in these networks. As the
strategic broker, we would have the upper hand in formulating the rules for competition.
Yet the fact that we cooperate with the nations of the world promises them benefits such
as converging growth rates. All nations could compete for the location of high value
economic activities. Within the U.S., cooperative competition would promote a healthy
domestic environment of technological and organizational innovation. Government policy
would not stifle but encourage and support industry to reach out and tap knowledge banks
throughout the world. In the information age, an alternate strategy of isolation supported
by policies to shelter domestic industry (as experienced in the industrial age) could have
disastrous consequences. (Note 56)
Beyond cooperative competition, we also need dynamic competition: competition that
allows new technologies to compete against and replace older technologies. In earlier
times, dynamic competition gave us the automobile while the world was still looking for
stronger horses (termed static competition). In the 1980s, dynamic competition transformed
the computer industry from mainframes to mini and personal computers. It gave the U.S.
world dominance in telecommunications, mircroelectronics, computer networking, and
software applications. Significantly, American business and technological leadership
created these vast new markets, not government oversight or policy making. (Note 57) Through dynamic
competition, we can further shape our competition and reap the greatest possible benefits
from our information age economy.
Wisdom Pyramid. While the information age equalizes competitors, the wisdom
pyramid mitigates against instability. Visualize a pyramid with the base composed of raw
data. Add the next layer and call it information that rises like cream to the top of the
data. On top of information, lay down another layer called experience. Finally, cap the
pyramid with wisdom. Each person is a product of his or her own experience. Information,
filtered up through that experience, creates wisdom at the top of the pyramid. (Note 58) So it is with
nation-states. The data and information others gain through information age networks has
real value only as it filters through real experience. More important, corporate knowledge
embedded in teams -- like NASA's team that put man on the moon -- is knowledge that none
of the individual team members knows alone. (Note 59) Embedded knowledge is hard,
if not impossible, to steal. Thus our experience and social networks that develop and use
information technologies are precious commodities. We can identify them as our strategic
center of gravity in the information age environment.
Productivity Paradox. Another precept of the information age is that useful
applications of knowledge require adaptive organizations and processes. The productivity
paradox says that, initially, organizations will insert new information technologies into
existing organizational structures. These technologies will simply improve the speed and
increase the efficiency of current processes. However, to take full advantage of the
technology, organizations need to change their processes and adapt their structures. (Note 60) In this way, we tailor our
knowledge to specific applications and capture the value of exchanged information. (Note 61)
Information age military forces, evolving in their use of cyberspace, will follow the
same path -- first accommodating information technologies by incorporation, and next by
reinventing their processes and adapting their organizational structures. (Note 62) We see technological
incorporation in the Army's effort to digitize the battlefield. The objective today is to
add "applique" computers to combat vehicles to improve situational awareness.
Yet true leveraging of computers depends less on improving situational awareness in every
combat vehicle and more on how the entire combat force reconfigures itself to exploit the
knowledge gained through the added technology. Such reinventing exploits the exponential
power of information networks.
Success in future wars will require armed forces with open, adaptable organizations
that can react more quickly to changes than can the competition. (Note 63) These organizations must
easily reconfigure to fill specific needs, saving time and money in the process. Such open
organizations are not wedded to any one operating system; they can rapidly incorporate new
information age technology. Ultimately, they must be adaptable to the knowledge they use.
Cyberocracy. The differences between a bureaucracy of the 20th century and a
cyberocracy of the information age highlight the importance of organizational adaptation.
Whereas bureaucracy forces and often limits information flow through defined channels
connecting discrete points, cyberocracy broadcasts large volumes of information among many
interested parties. Whereas bureaucracy emphasizes the hard quantitative skills of
programming and budgeting (like DoD's Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution
System), cyberocracy emphasizes soft skills such as policy management and understanding
culture and public opinion. Whereas bureaucracy observes traditional boundaries between
public and private sectors, cyberocracy breaks across these boundaries and allows for
mixing of public and private interests. Bureaucracies must transform into cyberocracies if
the new techniques of the information age are to take hold. (Note 64)
A cyberocracy should have greater capability than a bureaucracy for dealing with the
complex issues of an interconnected world. Yet to transform our organizations we must
break the paradigm that establishes "big budgets" and "big staffs" as
the basis of bureaucratic power. We must demonstrate the value of "big
information" as the source of power in a cyberocracy. (Note 65)
Information Dominance. In Infotrends, Jessica Keyes notes that "Most
organizations suffer from a proliferation of data that is either redundant or
underutilized. These same organizations suffer from not recognizing the true value of
their data." (Note 66) Once
the value of data is understood, knowledge derived from that data can be used offensively
to increase an edge or defensively to reduce an edge held by an opponent. (Note 67) The ability to recognize
the value of data and use this data to derive knowledge is the first step toward
information dominance.
Information dominance is achieved by transforming knowledge into capability. It is the
ability to identify the vulnerabilities and centers of gravity of an enemy, or even a
competitor or customer. It is the capability to reshape organizations and revise
strategies based upon a systematic analysis of the opponent. (Note 68) For example, Federal
Express (FedEx) won unchallenged leadership in global express delivery services when it
realized "that information about the package is just as important as the package
itself." (Note 69)
Understanding that the customer cares about where his or her package is at anytime, FedEx
transformed its knowledge of bar coding, hand held computers, and global
telecommunications into the capability to provide near real-time location information on
every package in their possession. (Note
70)
Knowledge-based alliances that share resources and save costs can also propel
technology to new heights while preserving competition. For example, IBM and Apple
Computer agreed in 1991 to share knowledge to create a new computer operating system based
upon object-oriented technology and desktop multimedia software. Such a venture was too
costly for just one company to undertake. (Note 70) Recognizing strategic uses
of information technology and leveraging intellectual capital, as in the cases of FedEx,
IBM, and Apple Computer is truly in the realm of strategic art. However, as we found with
the productivity paradox, such success comes through process and structural changes within
the organization. (Note 72)
At the national strategic level, we should build flexible organizations (cyberocracies)
around information and intelligence processing, rather than around traditional functions
and bureaucratic departments. (Note
73) National information dominance is achieved through the fusion of all networks
(similar to the fusion of human, signals, electronic, and other kinds of intelligence into
all source intelligence). Offensively, national information networks can change the minds
of our adversaries if they are synchronized to carry specific but coordinated messages. (Note 74) Defensively, a national
information security strategy is required for the protection of our key information
systems, to include their nodes, communications links, and data. The effort exceeds the
responsibilities of the joint military services; critical information and networks
belonging to all federal agencies, the private sector, and even our allies must as well be
protected.
A Formula for Knowledge Strategy. To this point, we have identified several
facets of the strategic information age environment and cybercratic institutions that
shape knowledge strategies. Before redefining the strategy paradigm, we must recall two
additional characteristics of network theory: First, value is added only at nodes; second,
the strength of networks comes from their redundancy, or multiple pathways between any two
points.
Consider our nation's interstate highway network and how it has enabled our economy to
grow. Many businesses and industries locate close to city beltways (nodes) and bring great
wealth to these areas. Moreover, when adverse weather or construction blocks one route,
usually a near-by route can handle the traffic. Similarly, governments that take the lead
in shaping information networks and in locating nodes within their borders stand to reap
enormous comparative advantage. (Note
75) Because of multiple nodes and pathways, networks have no center of gravity and
must be defeated in detail. (Note 76)
Moreover, bureaucracies might be defeated by networks (cyberocracies), so it may take
networks to counter other networks. "The future may belong to whoever masters the
network form." (Note 77)
With some modification to the meaning of the additive terms, knowledge strategy fits
the strategy equals ends plus ways plus means equation. It follows from the discussions
above that knowledge strategy (KS) seeks the ends of cooperative and dynamic competition
(C/DC), uses the ways of node control and organizational adaptation (NC & OA), and
requires the resource means of valued information (VI) enhanced by experience (E).
Symbolically, the strategy equation changes to this:
Knowledge Strategy = Cooperative/Dynamic + Node Control + Info Dominance
KS = (C/DC) + NC & OA) + (VI x E)
Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means
Knowledge strategies focus on the strategic broker in crafting the rules of information
networks. Cooperative and dynamic competition permits us to pursue our national security
objectives in concert with other nations while shaping the competition. Control of network
nodes adds value to information, strengthening information dominance and denying dominance
by others. Organizational adaptation overcomes the productivity paradox and ensures that
we exploit information networks to their fullest potential. Finally, knowledge strategies
require information dominance that comes from the value of information enhanced by
experience.
Knowledge strategies incur a degree of risk unless we balance all elements of the
equation. Unbalanced conditions can result if cooperative and dynamic competition are not
the stated objectives of the strategy, if we don't control the network nodes, if
productivity suffers because the organization hasn't truly adapted to the technologies, or
if the value of information is high but the experience to exploit this information is low.
Conclusion
The information age has shifted the focus of our values and national interests.
Empowered by information age technologies, we have come to value individual preference in
products and services and direct participation in the democratic process. Similarly, the
pursuit of economic well-being and the promotion of democratic values takes on added
importance in contrast to our traditional security interests. Information is fast becoming
a strategic national asset. Thus, the security and integrity of our cyberspace must now be
considered an important, if not vital, national interest that we cannot afford to
compromise.
A successful information age security strategy requires that we balance the ends, ways,
and means of knowledge strategies. Whether we use the political, economic, military, or
informational elements of national power, we serve our strategic ends best when we
cooperate to shape robust information networks that promote dynamic competition and
enhance mutual performance. Ironically, global information networks, built to bring peace
and prosperity to the world, will be among the first attacked in a cyberwar. Denying
access to these networks in hopes of preempting attack is totally counterproductive: it
accomplishes the adversary's mission for him! Therefore, before an enemy attempts to fire
the first hostile bits across our networks, we must control network nodes and
communications links and secure our information resources.
Successful knowledge strategies require the mastery of information networks.
Information networks operate on the win-win philosophy: one wins only if all win. The more
our national interests reflect those of the networks, the better chance we have of
achieving them. Thus, we must be the primary architects of networks and seek to broker
network operations. At times, we must be willing to subordinate our national objectives to
the greater objectives of the networked nations and multinational firms with whom we
interact. We must be willing to share knowledge resources and enter into knowledge-based
alliances that allow us to leverage information age technologies. Our government can
empower information age enterprise and encourage innovation by easing access to global
networks. In relations with other nations, we should trade economic network integration
for democratic and human rights reform. A more stable and safer world is one whose players
share similar values and interests and who depend upon each other in a globally networked
market economy.
We must realize that our strategic center of gravity is shifting to encompass our
experience and the virtual communities we establish to exploit the information
environment. We must care for our knowledge workers and educate the youth of our nation
who will take their place. We can't exploit the information age without them. The
"hub of all power and movement" in the information age will be our dominant
knowledge. (Note 78) Only through
non traditional open organizations with decentralized power structures can we truly
achieve this dominance. We must create cooperative cyberocracies organized around the
knowledge workers and processes that can best exploit all available information networks.
Thus the ways of a knowledge strategy must break down the boundaries between government
bureaucracies and the private sector. Most important, the extent of organizational
adaptation -- and how much it ultimately transforms the rules of information age networks
and cyberwar -- will determine whether we are using information age technologies to our
fullest advantage.
Finally, to resource information age strategies, we must recognize that knowledge is a
very economical means that can stretch and positively leverage our nation's wealth.
Declining defense budgets have been -- and will continue to be -- the primary engines
transforming the U.S. military and driving information age technologies into the hands of
our armed forces. However, just as our armed forces engage in a revolution in military
affairs, so must other government agencies and the private sector engage in revolutions in
political, economic, and informational affairs. Big bureaucracies with big operating
budgets must downsize and leverage the power of information. We must share knowledge
resources within the federal government and between the public and private sectors, even
as they are transforming to adapt to the information age. We must invest only in those
information age technologies and intellectual capital that will generate the most
significant returns in information dominance.
Again, we should recall that France's disappointment in World War II was not that she
was surprised, but that she made the wrong strategic security choices. (Note 79) France knew that war with
Germany was coming. So she prepared for that war. However, she failed to understand the
significance of the new mechanized age. Germany understood the strategic importance of
mechanization and overwhelmed France with the blitzkrieg.
So it is with the United States today. The dawning information age gives us an
opportunity to make strategic choices. We must not simply continue the security strategies
of the past. Rather, we must seek to understand the strategic importance of knowledge and
discover the rules of cyberspace and cyberwar. Understanding how to balance the ends,
ways, and means of knowledge strategies is the first step in making the right strategic
choices for the emerging information age.
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